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Justice Brent Benjamin of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia refused to recuse himself from the appeal of the $50
million jury verdict in this case, even though the CEO of the lead
defendant spent $3 million supporting his campaign for a seat on
the court-more than 60% of the total amount spent to support
Justice Benjamin's campaign-while preparing to appeal the ver-
dict against his company. After winning election to the court, Jus-
tice Benjamin cast the deciding vote in the court's 3-2 decision
overturning that verdict. The question presented is whether Jus-
tice Benjamin's failure to recuse himself from participation in his
principal financial supporter's case violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
In addition to the parties named in the caption, Elk Run Coal
Company, Inc., Independence Coal Company, Inc., Marfork Coal
Company, Inc., Performance Coal Company, and Massey Coal
Sales Company, Inc., were defendants -appellants below and are
respondents in this Court.
Pursuant to this Court's Rule 29.6, undersigned counsel state
that Sovereign Coal Sales, Inc., and Harman Mining Corporation
are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Harman Development Corpora-
tion. Harman Development Corporation has no parent corpora-




The opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia is
not yet published but is electronically reported at 2008 W. Va.
LEXIS 22. J.A. 485a. Justice Benjamin's orders declining to re-
cuse himself are not reported. Id. at 336a, 442a, 482a.
JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia entered judg-
ment on April 3, 2008. The petition for a writ of certiorari was
filed on July 2, 2008, and granted on November 14, 2008. This
Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in
relevant part:
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law. . ..
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
STATEMENT
After a jury returned a $50 million fraud verdict against res-
pondent A.T. Massey Coal Co. ("Massey"), Massey's chairman,
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CEO, and president, Don L. Blankenship, set out to single-
handedly change the composition of the only state court that could
hear Massey's appeal-the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vir-
ginia. As Massey prepared its appeal, a previously unknown law-
yer, Brent Benjamin, launched a challenge to the re-election of
Supreme Court Justice Warren McGraw. In June 2004, Mr. Ben-
jamin's campaign appeared to be a long shot; his campaign com-
mittee had reported contributions totaling only $25,000. Motion of
Respondent Corporations for Disqualification of Justice Benjamin
("Disqual. Mtn.") Ex. 27.
Benjamin's campaign began to gain momentum, however, after
Mr. Blankenship threw his full weight (and great personal wealth)
behind the campaign. Mr. Blankenship contributed the maximum
amount permitted by West Virginia law to Benjamin's campaign
committee. He then spent 3,000 times that amount-some $3 mil-
lion-to underwrite independent advertisements supporting Ben-
jamin, while publicly urging others to make additional donations
to the campaign. Ultimately, Mr. Blankenship was personally
responsible for more than 60% of the total financial support for
the Benjamin campaign-three times as much as Benjamin's own
campaign committee. Upon Justice Benjamin's election to the
state supreme court, some in West Virginia wondered aloud
whether Massey had "b[ought] itself a judge." See infra pg. 8.
When Massey's case came before the newly-reconstituted Su-
preme Court of Appeals, petitioners repeatedly moved for Justice
Benjamin to recuse himself from his principal financial suppor-
ter's case. Justice Benjamin refused, insisting that his participa-
tion "was wholly consistent with due process" because petitioners
had not proven "any actual bias" on his part. J.A. 654a, 657a. He
then cast the deciding vote in the court's 3-2 decision overturning
the verdict against Massey.
Justice Benjamin's decision not to recuse himself was constitu-
tionally flawed and should be reversed. Petitioners had a consti-
tutional right to a panel of "neutral and detached judge[s]" to de-
cide this appeal (Ward v. Vili. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 62
(1972)), and, to preserve that right, Justice Benjamin was re-
quired to recuse himself not only upon proof of actual bias, but
also when confronted with an objective "probability of actual bias."
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). Mr. Blankenship's ex-
traordinary efforts on behalf of Justice Benjamin's campaign-
undertaken when Mr. Blankenship was preparing to appeal a
judgment of great personal and professional significance to the
very court on which Justice Benjamin was seeking a seat-created
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a constitutionally unacceptable probability that Justice Benjamin
was biased in favor of Massey and against petitioners. Justice
Benjamin's refusal to recuse himself denied petitioners their fun-
damental due process right to an impartial judge and, in so doing,
substantially undermined the integrity of the West Virginia judi-
cial system.
1. Massey is one of the Nation's largest coal companies. Until
the corporate petitioners-Harman Development Corporation,
Harman Mining Corporation, and Sovereign Coal Sales, Inc.-
were forced into bankruptcy by Massey's fraudulent business
practices, they competed with Massey through the production of
coal at the Harman Mine in Virginia. J.A. 488a.
This case arose out of Massey's efforts to obtain the business of
LTV Steel ("LTV"), one of the principal purchasers of petitioners'
coal. LTV had repeatedly refused to purchase Massey's coal be-
cause it "was inferior in quality to the coal obtained from the
Harman Mine." J.A. 492a n. 1. In an effort to secure LTV's busi-
ness, Massey purchased the parent of Wellmore Coal Corporation
("Wellmore"), which was the sole direct purchaser of petitioners'
coal and which, in turn, resold that coal to LTV. Id. at 492a.
"Massey hoped to substitute its own coal for the Harman Mine
coal that Wellmore had been supplying to LTV." Id. LTV, howev-
er, refused to accept the substitution of Massey coal for Harman
coal and severed its business relationship with Wellmore. Id. at
493a.
At the direction of Massey's CEO, Mr. Blankenship, Welimore
responded by invoking the force majeure clause in its coal supply
agreement with petitioners Sovereign Coal Sales, Inc., and Har-
man Mining Corporation-a provision that excused nonperfor-
mance due to "acts of God, acts of the public enemy, epidemics,"
and other "causes reasonably beyond the control" of the parties-
and drastically reduced the amount of coal that it agreed to pur-
chase from petitioners. J.A. 64a, 490a n.8, 493a. As the trial
court found, "Massey knew" that this "declaration" "would put [pe-
titioners] out of business." Id. at 494a. Indeed, "Massey delayed
Wellmore's termination of [the] contract until late in the year,
knowing it would be virtually impossible for [petitioners] to find
alternate buyers for [their] coal at that point in time." Id.
Massey simultaneously entered into negotiations with petition-
ers to purchase the Harman Mine. J.A. 493a. The trial court
found that Massey "utilized the confidential information it had
obtained" from petitioners during these negotiations "to take fur-
ther actions"-including the purchase of a narrow band of coal
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reserves surrounding the entire Harman Mine-"in order to make
the Harman Mine unattractive to others and thereby decrease its
value." Id. at 494a-95a. Massey then "delayed" consummation of
its agreement to purchase the Harman Mine and "ultimately col-
lapsed the transaction in such a manner so as to increase [peti-
tioners'] financial distress." Id. at 494a (internal quotation marks
omitted). Left without a purchaser for either their coal or their
mining facilities, the corporate petitioners were compelled to cease
operations and file for bankruptcy. Id. at 495a.
2. In 1998, petitioners filed suit against Massey and several af-
filiated companies in the Circuit Court of Boone County, West
Virginia, to recover damages attributable to Massey's unlawful
interference with petitioners' business relations and Massey's
fraudulent conduct during its negotiations to purchase the Har-
man Mine. J.A. 496a.
Mr. Blankenship was the central figure in the trial. Petitioners
alleged that Mr. Blankenship had personally directed Massey's
unlawful course of conduct in order to force petitioners into bank-
ruptcy (J.A. 63a-65a), and Mr. Blankenship provided extensive
testimony at trial about his dealings with petitioners.
After a seven-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in August
2002 that found Massey liable for tortious interference with exist-
ing contractual relations, fraudulent misrepresentation, and frau-
dulent concealment, and awarded petitioners more than $50 mil-
lion in compensatory and punitive damages. J.A. 497a.
The trial court denied Massey's post-trial motions challenging
the verdict and the size of the damages award, finding that Mas-
sey "intentionally acted in utter disregard of Plaintiffs' rights and
ultimately destroyed Plaintiffs' businesses because, after conduct-
ing cost-benefit analyses, [Massey] concluded it was in its finan-
cial interest to do so." J.A. 32a.
3. Immediately after the verdict was announced, Mr. Blanken-
ship publicly vowed that Massey would appeal the result, which
he criticized as "frightening" and bad for "the children of our
state." J.A. 115~a. Due to the delay generated by Massey's numer-
ous post-trial motions (including its challenge to the accuracy of
the trial transcript), Massey did not file a petition for review of the
trial court's judgment in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals-the sole appellate court in the State-until October 24,
2006.
In the time between the 2002 verdict and Massey's 2006 petition
for review, the composition of the West Virginia Supreme Court of
744 Vol. 48
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Appeals was altered by lawyer Brent Benjamin's 2004 electoral
victory over incumbent Justice Warren McGraw.
Mr. Blankenship played a significant-and very public-role in
that election, spending $3 million of his own money to support
Justice Benjamin's campaign and actively soliciting additional
financial support from other donors. Mr. Blankenship's extraor-
dinary level of support for the Benjamin campaign was unparal-
leled and virtually unprecedented. Indeed, the $3 million that he
expended in support of Justice Benjamin was more than the total
amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters combined, three
times the amount spent by Justice Benjamin' s own campaign
committee, and likely more than any other individual spent on a
judicial election that year. J.A. 288a; see also infra note 4.
Most of Mr. Blankenship's campaign expenditures were made
through And For The Sake Of The Kids, a so-called "527 organiza-
tion" that, according to Mr. Blankenship, was formed after the
verdict in this case for the purpose of "beat[ing] Warren McGraw,"
the incumbent justice against whom Brent Benjamin was running,
and that was "named for its belief that McGraw's policies [were]
bad for children and their future." Tom Diana, W Va. Coal Execu-
tive Works to Oust McGraw, Wheeling News-Register, Oct. 25,
2004; Brad McElhinny, Big-Bucks Backer Felt He Had to Try,
Charleston Daily Mail, Oct. 25, 2004, at 1A. By the time of the
election, Mr. Blankenship had donated $2,460,500 to And For The
Sake Of The Kids-more than two-thirds of the total funds raised
by the organization. J.A. 150a. 1
And For The Sake Of The Kids used most of these funds to
finance hundreds of campaign advertisements in the weeks pre-
ceding the election, including a series of television ads that ac-
cused Justice McGraw of voting to release an incarcerated child
molester and to permit him to work in a high school. See Deborah
Goldberg et al., The New Politics of Judicial Elections 4-5 (2004)
(describing one of these ads, which stated, "Letting a child rapist
go free? To work in our schools? That's radical Supreme Court
Justice Warren McGraw. Warren McGraw-too soft on crime.
Too dangerous for our kids.").
In addition to the nearly $2.5 million that Mr. Blankenship do-
nated to And For The Sake Of The Kids, he spent another
1. Nationally, only fouur political groups directly involved in state elections ini 2004
outraised And For The Sake Of The Kids: the Republican Governors Association, the Dem-
ocratic Governors Association, the Republican State Leadership Committee, and the Demo-
cratic Legislative Campaign Committee. Disqual. Mtn. Ex. 17.
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$517,707 of his personal funds on independent expenditures di-
rectly supporting the Benjamin campaign, mostly through pay-
ments to media outlets for television and newspaper advertise-
ments. J.A. 186a, 200a. Mr. Blankenship also worked to solicit
funds on behalf of Justice Benjamin's campaign. Most notably, he
widely distributed letters exhorting doctors to donate to the cam-
paign because electing Justice Benjamin would purportedly help
to lower their malpractice premiums. Id. at 181a.
Mr. Blankenship's significant efforts on behalf of the Benjamin
campaign did not go unnoticed. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Judicial
Races in Several States Become Partisan Battlegrounds, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 24, 2004, at Al; Toby Coleman, Coal Companies Pro-
vide Big Campaign Bucks, Charleston Gazette, Oct. 15, 2004, at
IA. Indeed, a number of observers openly questioned the motives
behind Mr. Blankenship's extraordinary campaign expenditures
at a time when Massey was preparing to appeal a $50 million ver-
dict to the state supreme court. See, e.g., William Kistner, Justice
fo r Sale, American RadioWorks (2005), at
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/Judges/ ("One
of [Justice Benjamin's] major backers was the CEO of Massey
Energy Company, the largest coal producer in the region. The
company happened to be fighting off a major lawsuit headed to the
West Virginia Supreme Court. That prompted many in these
parts to say that Massey was out to buy itself a judge."); Edward
Peeks, Editorial, How Does Political Cash Help Uninsured?, Char-
leston Gazette, Nov. 9, 2004, at 2D ("[Tihese voices raise the ques-
tion of vote buying to a new high in politics.").
The $3 million that Mr. Blankenship spent to support the Ben-
jamin campaign bore fruit: Justice Benjamin defeated Justice
McGraw in the November 2004 election and was sworn in as a
justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in January
2005.
4. Before Massey filed its petition in the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals seeking review of the $50 million judg-
ment against it, petitioners filed a motion requesting that Justice
Benjamin recuse himself from participation in Massey's forthcom-
ing appeal. In accordance with the West Virginia Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, the motion was directed solely to Justice Benja-
min, and his decision was not subject to review by any other mem-
ber of the court. See W. Va. R. App. P. 29.
In their recusal motion, petitioners argued that federal due
process required Justice Benjamin to recuse himself from partici-
pation in Massey's appeal because Mr. Blankenship's extraordi-
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nary support for Justice Benjamin's campaign created a constitu-
tionally unacceptable appearance of bias. J.A. 108a. Massey did
not file a response to petitioners' motion to recuse Justice Benja-
min (or to either of petitioners' two subsequent recusal motions
directed to Justice Benjamin). Indeed, at the same time that peti-
tioners were seeking the recusal of Justice Benjamin, Massey was
seeking the recusal of another justice on the West Virginia Su-
preme Court, Justice Larry Starcher, on the ground that he had
made public statements critical of Mr. Blankenship's involvement
in the 2004 election. After Justice Starcher initially refused to
recuse himself, Massey filed suit against the West Virginia Su-
preme Court alleging that the court's recusal procedures violate
its "rights to the appearance of justice under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" because the procedures do
not provide a means for the full court to review a justice's decision
not to recuse himself. Compi. at 5, Massey Energy Co. v. W Va.
Supreme Court of Appeals, No. 06-0614 (S.D. W. Va. filed Aug. 8,
2006). That suit remains pending.
In an April 7, 2006, memorandum, Justice Benjamin declined to
recuse himself, writing that "no objective information is advanced
to show that this Justice has a bias for or against any litigant,
that this Justice has prejudged the matters which comprise this
litigation, or that this Justice will be anything but fair and impar-
tial in his consideration of matters related to this case." J.A. 336a-
37a.
5. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals thereafter
granted Massey's petition for review. In a 3-2 decision, the court
reversed the $50 million verdict against Massey and dismissed the
case with prejudice-while "mak[ing] perfectly clear that the facts
of this case demonstrate that Massey's conduct warranted the
type of judgment rendered"' against it. J.A. 357a. Justice Benja-
min joined the majority's opinion reversing the verdict against
Massey.
Creating nearly a dozen new points of West Virginia law, the
majority held that petitioners' suit against Massey was barred by
a forum-selection clause in the coal supply agreement that Sove-
reign Coal Sales, Inc., and Harman Mining Corporation had en-
tered into with Wellmore, which provided that "[aill actions
brought in connection with this Agreement shall be filed in and
decided by the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Virginia." J.A.
358a. The majority reached this conclusion even though it ac-
knowledged that neither Massey itself nor two of the petitioners-
Harman Development Corporation and Mr. Hugh Caperton-were
Fall 2010 747
748 ~Duquesne Law ReviewVo.4
parties to the agreement and that the causes of action on which
petitioners prevailed sounded in tort, rather than contract. Id. at
377a, 386a-87a.
The majority further held, in the alternative, that petitioners'
suit was foreclosed by principles of res judicata because Sovereign
Coal Sales and Harman Mining had obtained a breach-of-contract
verdict against Weilmore in a Virginia state court based on Well-
more's improper invocation of the force majeure clause in the coal
supply agreement. J.A. 411la. In so holding, the majority disre-
garded the fact that Massey, Harman Development, and Mr. Ca-
perton were not parties to the Virginia action; that the Virginia
action involved breach-of-contract, not fraud, claims; that the cas-
es involved vastly different issues and evidence; and that the Vir-
ginia action had been on appeal, and was thus nonfinal for res j'u-
dicata purposes, at the time Massey moved in the trial court to
dismiss petitioners' suit on res judicata grounds. Id. at 392a,
406a, 407a.
Justices Albright and Starcher filed vigorous dissents. Both ex-
pressed alarm at the "result-driven effort" of the majority to re-
lieve Massey of liability. J.A. 423a; see also id. at 420a. According
to Justice Albright, the majority "went out of its way to make find-
ings that fit its intended result" and did so "by twisting logic, mi-
sapplying the law and introducing sweeping 'new law' into our
jurisprudence." Id. at 429a, 430a-31a (emphasis omitted).
6. Petitioners timely petitioned for rehearing. While that peti-
tion was pending, photographs were made public showing Chief
Justice Maynard, who had joined the majority's opinion in favor of
Massey, vacationing with Mr. Blankenship on the French Riviera
during the pendency of Massey's appeal. See Paul J. Nyden, Coal
Operator Says Photos Show Maynard Should Not Hear Appeal,
Charleston Gazette, Jan. 15, 2008, at 1A. Petitioners promptly
moved for the recusal of Chief Justice Maynard based on his
Monte Carlo vacation with Mr. Blankenship. J.A. 432a. Petition-
ers simultaneously renewed their request that Justice Benjamin
recuse himself based on the appearance of bias generated by Mr.
Blankenship's exceptional support for Justice Benjamin's 2004
campaign. Id.
Chief Justice Maynard recused himself from further participa-
tion in the case. J.A. 447a. Although he professed the ability to
be impartial in his consideration of Massey's appeal, he neverthe-
less concluded that his participation in the case was inappropriate
because the "mere appearance of impropriety .. . can compromise
the public confidence in the courts." Id.
Vol. 48748
Fall 2010Briefing Judicial Independence74
Justice Benjamin, however, again refused to recuse himself
(J.A. 445a)-notwithstanding widespread public demands that he
step aside from the case in order to restore the perception of an
impartial and unbiased judiciary in West Virginia. See, e.g., Edi-
torial, Bravo, Charleston Gazette, Feb. 16, 2008, at 4A ("Benjamin
remains the only Massey-connected justice still presiding over
Massey cases. Clearly, for the sake of impartiality, he should...
recus[e] himself from all Massey cases.").
Justice Benjamin, as the justice next in line for the court's rotat-
ing chief justiceship, selected a state circuit court judge to replace
Chief Justice Maynard. The reconstituted court granted petition-
ers' petition for rehearing and set the case for reargument. J.A.
449a.2
Shortly thereafter, Justice Starcher recused himself from fur-
ther participation in the case due to the perception created by his
public statements criticizing Mr. Blankenship's role in Justice
Benjamin' s campaign. J.A. 462a. In his recusal order, Justice
Starcher urged Justice Benjamin also to step aside from the case,
asserting that Mr. Blankenship's extraordinary campaign expend-
itures gave rise to "the very definition of 'appearance of improprie-
ty"' and "have far more egregiously tainted the perceived impar-
tiality of this Court than any statement" he had made about Mr.
Blankenship. Id. at 456a, 460a.
To substantiate Justice Starcher's observations, petitioners
submitted a third recusal motion to Justice Benjamin accompa-
nied by poll results indicating that 67% of West Virginians
doubted his ability to be fair and impartial in deciding Massey's
appeal. J.A. 467a. Justice Benjamin nevertheless again refused
to recuse himself, declaring that the results were "neither credible
nor sufficiently reliable to serve as the basis for an elected judge's
disqualification." Id. at 483a.
2. Under established seniority and rotation procedures uniformly followed by the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals for twenty-eight years, Justice Albright, not Justice
Benjamin, would have been next in line for the court's rotating chief justiceship and would
have appointed a replacement for Chief Justice Maynard. See J.A. 457a (Starcher, J., re-
cusing); Paul J. Nyden, Albright Passed over for Chief Justice, Charleston Gazette, Nov. 23,
2007, at IA. Justice Benjamin secured this authority, however, when Chief Justice May-
nard, Justice Davis, and Justice Benjamin-the three justices who formed the majority in
the first opinion in favor of Massey-voted to disregard those long-standing procedures and
to move Justice Benjamin ahead of Justice Albright in the order of succession to the chief
justiceship. Id.; see also J.A. 457a (Starcher, J., recusing) (Chief Justice Maynard "recently
voted to remove two justices from the Chief Justice rotation order, materially affecting the
appointment of replacement judges in cases involving Mr. Blankenship's companies").
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That same day, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals-
which now included two circuit court judges appointed by Justice
Benjamin to replace Chief Justice Maynard and Justice Starch-
er-issued its opinion on rehearing, and again reversed the judg-
ment against Massey by a 3-2 vote. J.A. 485a. Justice Benjamin
joined the majority opinion, which relied on the same legally du-
bious forum-selection and res judicata grounds as the court's ear-
lier decision in favor of Massey.
Justice Albright, now joined by Circuit Judge Cookman, stre-
nuously dissented, contending that "the majority consciously chose
to decide this case in such a way as to allow wrongdoers to skirt
the consequences of their actions." J.A. 633a. The dissenting opi-
nion meticulously critiqued the factual findings and new points of
law fashioned "to achieve the result desired by the majority." Id.
at 583a.
In addition to their disagreement with the majority's forum-
selection and res judicata analyses, the dissenters also explained
that they were "unable to stand silent" regarding Justice Benja-
min's failure to recuse himself. J.A. 633a n.16 (Albright, J., dis-
senting). "Upon reviewing the cases of Aetna Life Insurance Com-
pany v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986), and In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955)," the dissenters wrote, "it is clear that both actual
and apparent conflicts can have due process implications on the
outcome of cases affected by such conflicts." J.A. 633a n.16 (Al-
bright, J., dissenting). "It is now clear, especially from the last
motion for disqualification filed in this case," they continued, "that
there are now genuine due process implications arising under fed-
eral law, and therefore under our law, which have not been ad-
dressed." Id.
7. Four months after the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals' decision on rehearing-and nearly a month after the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari was filed in this Court--Justice Benja-
min filed a concurring opinion that provided a lengthy explanation
for his decision not to recuse himself from Massey's appeal. J.A.
635a. Justice Benjamin insisted that his "participation herein
was wholly consistent with due process" because petitioners had
not "claim[ed]l any actual bias or prejudice on [his] part." Id. at
654a-55a, 657a (emphasis added). Justice Benjamin maintained
that "appearances"--even the overwhelming appearance of bias
generated by a CEO's expenditure of $3 million to support the
campaign of a judge deciding his company's appeal-" should never
alone serve as the basis for a due process challenge" to a judge's
participation in a case. Id. at 657a n. 14. Indeed, in Justice Ben-
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jamin's view, the "very notion of appearance -driven disqualifying
conflicts . .. is antithetical to due process" and would have a "long-
lasting negative effect on public confidence in our courts." Id. at
655a n.12, 663a.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Justice Benjamin was constitutionally required to recuse him-
self from this case because Mr. Blankenship's extraordinary sup-
port for his election campaign created an objective probability that
he was biased in favor of Massey and against petitioners.
A. In order to safeguard the constitutional right to an impartial
judge, "our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even
the probability of unfairness." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955). To that end, this Court has repeatedly held that due
process requires recusal not only where there is proof that a judge
is actually biased, but also where an objective inquiry establishes
a probability of bias on a judge's part. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 532 (1927); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825
(1986); see also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
This objective recusal standard is required to ensure that liti-
gants receive a "fair trial in a fair tribunal" (Murchison, 349 U.S.
at 136) because, in most cases, it is extraordinarily difficult to
prove that a judge harbors a subjective bias against a litigant.
Judges are highly unlikely to acknowledge that they are biased,
and discovery is almost always unavailable to substantiate the
existence of judicial bias. A standard that tolerated adjudication
by any judge who has not been conclusively proven to be partial
would relegate parties to trial before judges with a strongly sus-
pected, yet unprovable, bias and would profoundly undermine
public confidence in the integrity and legitimacy of the judicial
branch.
B. It is not the case that recusal is constitutionally required
whenever a judge receives campaign support from a litigant or
attorney-especially where that support represents only a small
fraction of the total support for the judge's campaign. In this case,
however, there are at least five reasons that Mr. Blankenship's
campaign support generated a constitutionally unacceptable prob-
ability that Justice Benjamin was biased in favor of Massey and
against petitioners.
When viewed together, the facts surrounding Mr. Blankenship's
underwriting of Justice Benjamin's campaign-the staggering
amount of money that Mr. Blankenship expended, the fact that
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Mr. Blankenship's expenditures represented more than half of the
total financial support for Justice Benjamin, Mr. Blankenship's
additional fundraising efforts on the campaign's behalf, his provi-
sion of this support while preparing this multimillion- dollar ap-
peal to the state supreme court, and the fact that Justice Benja-
min's participation in this case was not subject to review by any
other justice-created an overwhelming probability of bias that
required Justice Benjamin to recuse himself.
C. None of Justice Benjamin's reasons for refusing to recuse
himself from this case is constitutionally sufficient.
Although Justice Benjamin emphasized that he has voted
against Massey's interests in other cases, he failed to identify any
case in which he has cast an outcome -determinative vote against
Massey. And the fact that Mr. Blankenship is the chairman,
CEO, and president of Massey-rather than a named party-is
similarly irrelevant. Mr. Blankenship is a substantial stockholder
in Massey who personally directed Massey's unlawful conduct
against petitioners. He therefore has a strong personal and pro-
fessional interest in the outcome of this case-which created a
compelling reason for Justice Benjamin to repay his debt of grati-
tude to Mr. Blankenship by casting the deciding vote in Massey's
favor.
The likelihood that Justice Benjamin harbored, and sought to
repay, that debt of gratitude in this case is not diminished by Mr.
Blankenship's use of independent expenditures, rather than direct
contributions, to furnish his financial support. The end result was
the same: Mr. Blankenship's expenditures were directly responsi-
ble for hundreds of pro-Benjamin and anti-McGraw campaign ad-
vertisements that unquestionably helped Justice Benjamin-a
previously unknown and underfunded candidate-prevail in his
sharply contested race. It would only be natural for Justice Ben-
jamin to feel indebted to Mr. Blankenship for these extraordinary
efforts on his behalf.
Justice Benjamin's decision not to recuse himself should be re-
versed.
ARGUMENT
Justice Benjamin refused to recuse himself from Massey's ap-
peal because he found that petitioners had not proven "any actual
bias" on his part. J.A. 654a. Justice Benjamin's self-serving con-
clusion that due process requires recusal only where there is de-
finitive proof of a judge's actual bias against a party is inconsis-
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tent with this Court's well-settled precedent, which establishes
that "any tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies
not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the appear-
ance of bias." Commonwealth Coatings Corp. V. Cont'l Cas. Co.,
393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (emphasis added). W~here, as here, the
"appearance of bias" is serious enough to create a "probability"
that the judge is actually biased against a litigant, due process
requires the judge's recusal. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
Section 7.01 Due Process Required Justice Benjamin To Recuse
Himself From The Appeal 0/ His Principal Financial Suppor-
ter.
This Court has emphasized that a "fair trial in a fair tribunal is
a basic requirement of due process." Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.
A "neutral and detached judge" is an essential component of this
due process requirement. Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S.
57, 62 (1972). Justice Benjamin's participation in this appeal de-
nied petitioners this fundamental due process right.
A. Due Process Requires The Recusal Of A Judge Who Is Actually
Biased Or Tainted By A Probability Of Bias.
Justice Benjamin's primary basis for refusing to recuse himself
from this case was his contention that due process requires the
recusal of a judge only where there is definitive proof of "actual
bias" on his part. J.A. 654a; see also id. at 336a-37a ("no objective
information is advanced to show that this Justice has a bias for or
against any litigant"). This was error.
1. It is a basic principle of due process that a judge may not
participate in a case where he is actually biased against one of the
parties. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136. It is equally well -established
that "our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even
the probability of unfairness." Id. (emphasis added). This "strin-
gent rule," the Court has explained, "may sometimes bar trial by
judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best
to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties.
But to perform its high function in the best way justice must satis-
fy the appearance of justice." Id. (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
In light of the importance of preserving the "appearance of jus-
tice," this Court has repeatedly held that, where an objective in-
quiry establishes a "probability" of bias on a judge's part, the judge
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is constitutionally barred from participating in a case even if there
is insufficient evidence to establish that the judge is subjectively
biased against a party. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136; Withrow, 421
U.S. at 47.
In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), for example, the Court
held that it violated due process for a village mayor to preside over
a criminal proceeding where the mayor was only paid for his ser-
vices if the defendant was convicted and where the village re-
ceived a share of any fine that was levied against the defendant.
Id. at 535. The Court acknowledged that "[tihere are doubtless
mayors who would not allow such a consideration as $12 costs in
each case to affect their judgment in it." Id. at 532. "[Blut the
requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure," the Court
continued, "is not satisfied by the argument that men of the high-
est honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on without
danger of injustice." Id. Whether or not the mayor was actually
biased against the defendant, due process prohibited him from
presiding over the case because "[elvery procedure which would
offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget
the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which
might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true be-
tween the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of
law." Id. (emphases added); see also North v. Russell, 427 U.S.
328, 337 (1976) (in Tumey, "[flinancial interest in the fines was
thought to risk a possible bias in finding guilt and fixing the
amount of fines, and the Court found that potential for bias im-
permissible") (emphases added).
Similarly, in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971), the
Court held that a judge who had been subjected to repeated verbal
abuse by a criminal defendant could not preside over the defen-
dant's criminal contempt proceedings. Id. at 466. Despite the ab-
sence of proof of actual bias on the judge's part, the Court con-
cluded that recusal was constitutionally required because "[nlo
one so cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that calm detach-
ment necessary for fair adjudication." Id. at 465 (emphasis add-
ed).3
3. See also Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47 ("experience teaches that the probability of actual
bias on the part of the judge . . . is too high to he constitutionally tolerable" in cases in
which the judge "has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before
him"); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974) (due process barred a judge who had be-
come embroiled in a running dispute with a contumacious attorney from presiding over a
contempt hearing because "there was such a likelihood of bias or an appearance of bias that
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This constitutional prohibition upon adjudication by judges
tainted by a probability of bias applies with equal force in the civil
setting. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813
(1986), the Court held that it violated due process for a state su-
preme court justice to participate in the court's review of a verdict
for bad-faith refusal to pay an insurance claim because the justice
was pursuing his own bad-faith suit against an insurance compa-
ny and the supreme court's decision could have had a direct im-
pact on the outcome of the justice's case. Id. at 825. The Court
explained that it was "not required to decide whether in fact Jus-
tice Embry was influenced, but only whether sitting on the case
then before the Supreme Court of Alabama would offer a possible
temptation to the average . .. judge to . .. lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true." Id. (alterations in original; internal
quotation marks omitted). Justice Embry's ongoing pursuit of
monetary damages through a cause of action identical to the one
pending before the state supreme court offered just such a "temp-
tation."
2. The due process prohibition upon adjudication by judges
tainted by a probability of bias is essential to ensuring that all
litigants receive their fundamental right to a "fair trial in a fair
tribunal." Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.
It is often exceptionally difficult-if not wholly impossible-to
present conclusive proof that a judge is subjectively biased. In-
deed, it is extraordinarily rare for a judge to acknowledge that he
harbors a bias against a litigant. See Crawford v. United States,
212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909) ("Bias ... might exist in the mind of one
..who was quite positive that he had no bias"). And it is nearly
equally rare for litigants to be afforded the opportunity for discov-
ery to obtain evidence of a judge's bias because the availability of
discovery generally rests in the "sound discretion" of the judge
whose impartiality is being challenged. In re Mart inez- Catala,
129 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 1997).
As in this case, then, most recusal motions must rely solely on
the publicly available facts about a judge. In light of this eviden-
tiary hurdle, the right of litigants to a fair trial before an unbiased
judge can only be vindicated by mandating recusal where these
publicly available facts create an objective "probability of actual
bias on the part of the judge." Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47; see also
the judge was unable to hold the balance between vindicating the interests of the court and
the interests of the accused") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136. A requirement that a litigant seeking
a judge's recusal conclusively establish the existence of judicial
bias would eviscerate the procedural protections afforded by due
process and relegate parties to trial before judges who harbor a
strongly suspected (but unprovable) bias against them.
For this reason, the Court has repeatedly recognized that, "even
if there is no showing of actual bias" on the part of a judge, "due
process is denied by circumstances that create the likelihood or
the appearance of bias" because such a possibility of judicial bias
creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk of actual bias. Peters
v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) (plurality op. of Marshall, J.); see
also Thmey, 273 U.S. at 532; Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 825. In Lavoie,
for example, the Court held that Justice Embry's recusal was con-
stitutionally required-despite the absence of proof of actual bi-
as-because his pending suit against another insurance company
created the probability that he was biased against Aetna. Id.
For similar reasons, federal law and state judicial codes general-
ly mandate recusal where a judge's "impartiality might reasonably
be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); see also ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct R. 2.11(A) (2007) (same). Although these stan-
dards are more stringent than the constitutional floor established
by the Due Process Clause-they require recusal whenever there
is a "reasonabl[e]," objective basis for questioning a judge's impar-
tiality (see Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994)), while
due process mandates recusal only when the appearance of par-
tiality is serious enough to generate an objective "probability of
actual bias" (Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47)-both the nonconstitutional
and due process recusal standards are animated by the same con-
cern about possible judicial bias.
The implications of permitting a judge to participate in a case
while tainted by a probability of bias transcend the constitutional
rights of the litigants in that particular case. It is axiomatic that
the "legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its
reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship." Mist retta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989). Tolerating the participa-
tion of a judge who is likely to harbor a bias against a litigant
would do irreparable harm to the public's confidence in the Judi-
cial system. See N. Y State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 128 S.
Ct. 791, 803 (2008) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The rule of law,
which is a foundation of freedom, presupposes a functioning judi-
ciary respected for its independence, its professional attainments,
and the absolute probity of its judges."). Neither the litigant rele-
gated to the tainted judicial proceeding nor the public evaluating
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the result of that proceeding is likely to take much solace from the
fact that, despite the overwhelming appearance of bias, there was
no definitive proof of actual bias. The legitimacy of the judicial
branch-just as much as the constitutional rights of individual
litigants-depends upon preserving the appearance of impartiality
in judicial proceedings.
3. These constitutional principles are well -established and have
been regularly reaffirmed. See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446
U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (due process "ensur[es] that no person will be
deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which
he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not
predisposed to find against him"). It is therefore not surprising
that Massey itself has repeatedly acknowledged-in this litigation
and closely related litigation-that due process prohibits the par-
ticipation of a judge who is tainted by a probability of bias.
When Massey sought the recusal of Justice Starcher in this case
based on his public criticism of Mr. Blankenship, it did so on the
ground that "Justice Starcher by his very public and derogatory
comments has created an appearance of partiality." Motion for
Disqualification of Justice Starcher at 8; see also id. at 8-9 ("avoid-
ing the appearance of impropriety is as important in developing
public confidence in our judicial system as avoiding impropriety
itself') (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, in its ongo-
ing § 1983 action against the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals, Massey has argued that Rule 29 of the West Virginia Rules
of Appellate Procedure "violates [its] rights to the appearance of
justice under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution insofar as the rule ..
permits a justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court who is the
subject of a disqualification motion exclusively to determine the
merits of that motion." Compl. at 5-6, Massey Energy Co., No. 06-
0614; see also Mem. in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment at 15, Massey Energy Co., No. 06-0614 ("Rule 29 also
violates the Due Process Clause because it undermines the court's
obligation to render the appearance of justice.").
Massey's suggestion in this Court that due process requires re-
cusal only "where the judge harbors some form of substantial ac-
tual bias" (Br. in Opp. 15) represents an abrupt about-face from
the position it unambiguously staked both earlier in this litigation
and in its related § 1983 suit. Massey's conveniently timed refor-
mulation of its views might have been necessary to facilitate its
defense of Justice Benjamin, but Massey's artificially narrow un-
derstanding of due process cannot be reconciled with its own pre-
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vious statements on the issue or with this Court's profound con-
cern for "prevent[ing] even the probability of unfairness" in judi-
cial proceedings. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.
B. Mr. Blankenship's Campaign Support For Justice Benjamin
Created A Constitutionally Unacceptable Probability 0/ Bias.
Mr. Blankenship's prodigious efforts on behalf of Justice Ben-
jamin's campaign, all undertaken while he prepared to appeal this
case to the state supreme court, generated an overwhelming prob-
ability that Justice Benjamin was biased in favor of Mr. Blanken-
ship's company and against petitioners in this case. Justice Ben-
jamin's insistence on nevertheless participating in his principal
financial supporter's appeal violated due process.
1. Judicial elections are a well- established and constitutionally
permissible means of selecting state court judges, and it is certain-
ly not the case that due process requires a judge to recuse himself
every time a litigant or attorney contributed to or otherwise sup-
ported the judge's election campaign. This is particularly true
where the contribution represents only a small fraction of the
overall financial support for a judge's campaign. Absent other
evidence, no reasonable observer would conclude that such modest
campaign support creates a probability that the judge is biased in
favor of the supporter.
But it is just as surely not the case that campaign support from
a litigant or attorney is never sufficient to compromise a judge's
impartiality and to require recusal. Maintaining the unassailable
neutrality of judicial decision-making is exceptionally-and uni-
quely-important to the judicial branch because the public's "re-
spect for judgments depends .. . upon the issuing court's absolute
probity." Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Neutral decision-making does not carry
the same importance to either of the political branches of govern-
ment. Indeed, while this Court has recognized a compelling gov-
ernment interest in extirpating actual corrupt quid pro quo trans-
actions, and the appearance of such transactions, from the politi-
cal branches (Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (per cu-
riam)), politicians are under no obligation to maintain neutrality
in their official acts and remain free to give preferential access
and consideration to their campaign supporters. In contrast, due
process absolutely prohibits a judge from according preferential
treatment to any litigant appearing before him. See White, 536
U.S. at 776 (due process "guarantees a party that the judge who
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hears his case will apply the law to him in the same way he ap-
plies it to any other party"). Accordingly, if a litigant's or attor-
ney's campaign support for a judge generates an objective proba-
bility of bias in favor of one of the parties to a case, due process
requires the judge's recusal. See Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136;
Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47.
For at least five reasons, any reasonable observer would con-
clude that Mr. Blankenship's support for Justice Benjamin's cam-
paign generated a constitutionally unacceptable probability that
Justice Benjamin was biased in favor of Massey in this case.
First, the sheer volume of Mr. Blankenship's financial support
for Justice Benjamin's campaign is truly staggering. West Virgin-
ia law imposes a $1,000 limit on contributions to judicial cam-
paigns. W. Va. Code § 3-8-12(o). Through his donations to And
For The Sake Of The Kids and direct expenditures on campaign
advertising, Mr. Blankenship spent 3,000 times that amount sup-
porting Justice Benjamin. The $3 million that Mr. Blankenship
spent is three times the amount spent by Justice Benjamin's own
campaign committee (J.A. 288a) and $1 million more than the to-
tal amount spent by Justice Benjamin's committee and the com-
mittee of his opponent, Justice Warren McGraw. See Goldberg,
supra, at 16. Indeed, the $2.5 million that Mr. Blankenship spent
to fund And For The Sake Of The Kids' campaign to elect Justice
Benjamin is more than any other individual or group contributed
to a 527 organization involved in any 2004 judicial election cam-
paign. See Rachel Weiss, Fringe Tactics: Special Interest Groups
Target Judicial Races 5 (2005). The next largest donor gave
$600,000 less than Mr. Blankenship. Id.
Second, the appearance of bias generated by the size of Mr.
Blankenship's campaign expenditures is reinforced by the fact
that his expenditures represent 60% of the total amount spent to
support Justice Benjamin's campaign.4 Thus, this is not a case
where the expenditures in question-even though large in abso-
lute terms-were matched by equally large donations from other
parties that could conceivably have diminished the probability of
judicial bias in favor of one specific donor.
Third, Mr. Blankenship did more than spend vast sums of mon-
ey to support Justice Benjamin's campaign. He also actively cam-
4. A total of $4,986,711 was spent supporting Justice Benjamin's 2004 campaign:
$3,623,500 by And For The Sake Of The Kids (Disqual. Mtn. Ex. 17), $845,504 by the Ben-
jamin for Supreme Court Committee (J.A. 288a), and $517,707 by Mr. Blankenship through
direct expenditures (id. at 186a, 200a).
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paigned for Justice Benjamin and solicited donations on his be-
half. Most notably, he distributed letters urging doctors to "send
$1000 to Brent Benjamin" because "[i]f Warren McGraw gets re-
elected to the West Virginia Supreme Court your insurance rates
will almost certainly be higher for the next twelve years than they
will be if Brent Benjamin gets elected." J.A. 181a. Mr. Blanken-
ship's letters are directly responsible for a portion of the more
than $800,000 donated to Justice Benjamin's campaign commit-
tee.
Fourth, the timing of Mr. Blankenship's campaign support
strongly suggests that it was intended to influence the outcome of
this $50 million appeal. Mr. Blankenship's campaign expendi-
tures and fundraising efforts were made between August 2004 and
November 2004 (J.A. 119a, 199a), when Mr. Blankenship was
preparing to appeal this personally and professionally significant
case to the court on which Justice Benjamin was seeking a seat.
Indeed, after the jury returned its verdict against Massey in Au-
gust 2002, Mr. Blankenship immediately made a public vow to
appeal the verdict to that court. Id. at 115a. Although the appeal
was delayed by Massey's post-trial motions, there was no doubt
during the 2004 campaign that the case would ultimately be de-
cided by the state supreme court and that, if elected, Justice Ben-
jamin would have the opportunity to cast a vote in that appeal.
Fifth, Justice Benjamin's decision to participate in Massey's ap-
peal was not subject to review by the other members of his court.
Where a judge's decision not to recuse himself is endorsed by the
court's other members, the likelihood of judicial bias may be dimi-
nished because the allegations of bias have been examined-and
rejected-by the judge's colleagues. In this case, not only were the
other justices of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals prec-
luded by state law from considering petitioners' recusal motions,
but three members of the court (two justices and a circuit judge
appointed to replace one of the recused justices) expressed strong
concerns about Justice Benjamin's participation in the case. See
J.A. 633a n. 16 (Albright, J., joined by Cookman, J., dissenting); id.
at 462a (Starcher, J., recusing). His colleagues' discomfort with
Justice Benjamin's refusal to recuse himself underscores the
strong probability of bias generated by Mr. Blankenship's support
for Justice Benjamin's campaign.
2. The probability that Justice Benjamin was biased in favor of
Massey and against petitioners is at least as strong as the proba-
bility of bias in Thmey, Mayberry, and Lavoie.
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Just as it is human nature for a judge to be biased against a
criminal defendant whose conviction would benefit the judge fi-
nancially or by whom he has been verbally abused, it is equally a
part of human nature for a judge to be biased in favor of a party
whose CEO facilitated his election through massive campaign ex-
penditures that were larger than the combined amount spent by
all of the judge's other supporters. Justice Benjamin won his seat
on the West Virginia Supreme Court by a narrow 53-to-47-percent
margin over Justice McGraw to become the first non-incumbent
Republican to secure a seat on that court since the 1920s. See Ju-
liet A. Terry, Courting Change: Benjamin Hopes to Shine Light on
Justice, State J. (W. Va.), Nov. 4, 2004, at 4; Lawrence Messina,
Benjamin Unseats McGraw After "Vicious," Pricey Court Race, As-
sociated Press State & Local Wire, Nov. 3, 2004. There can be lit-
tle doubt that the extensive advertising that Mr. Blankenship
funded through his direct expenditures and his contributions to
And For The Sake Of The Kids immensely improved Justice Ben-
jamin's electoral prospects in this closely contested race. It would
only be natural for Justice Benjamin to feel a debt of gratitude to
Mr. Blankenship for his extraordinary efforts on the campaign's
behalf. See White, 536 U.S. at 790 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("re-
lying on campaign donations may leave judges feeling indebted to
certain parties or interest groups").
Similarly, just as a judge is tainted by a constitutionally unac-
ceptable "temptation" to decide a case in a manner that furthers
his own interests where he is pursuing a lawsuit raising identical
legal issues, such a "temptation" is equally acute where the judge
is beholden to a corporation's CEO for the majority of the funds
spent in support of his recent campaign-and where casting an
outcome- determinative vote against the corporation in a multimil-
lion-dollar case may foreclose the possibility of similar financial
support when the judge seeks reelection.
In light of the overwhelming probability that Justice Benjamin
was biased in favor of Massey and against petitioners, due process
required Justice Benjamin to step aside from consideration of
Massey's appeal.
C. Justice Benjamin's Reasons For Refusing To Recuse Himself
Are Constitutionally Inadequate.
Although Justice Benjamin's primary ground for refusing to re-
cuse himself was his erroneous assertion that due process requires
recusal only where there is proof of "actual bias" (J.A. 654a), he
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also attempted to dispel the appearance of bias created by Mr.
Blankenship's extraordinary level of campaign support. None of
Justice Benjamin's rationalizations is constitutionally sufficient,
however, to excuse his participation in this case.
Justice Benjamin observed, for example, that he has voted
against Massey's interests in other cases. J.A. 674a n.29. But
Justice Benjamin points to no case-and we are aware of none-in
which he has cast an outcome -determinative vote against Massey.
5
In any event, the fact that a judge might not vote in favor of a par-
ticular litigant in every case hardly means that he does not harbor
a bias in favor of that litigant in any case. Cf. Bracy v. Gram ley,
520 U.S. 899, 901 (1997) (authorizing discovery into whether a
judge who regularly took bribes from criminal defendants had is-
sued rulings intended to facilitate the conviction of a defendant
who had not bribed him in order "to deflect suspicion that he was
taking bribes in other cases"). A judge tainted by a probability of
bias cannot constitutionally immunize his actions by the simple
expedient of failing invariably to vote in the manner suggested by
that bias.
Justice Benjamin also suggested that the appearance of bias
created by Mr. Blankenship's campaign support is minimized by
the fact that Mr. Blankenship is "an employee of a party in this
case" and not a party himself. J.A. 681a. But Mr. Blankenship is
far more than a mere employee of Massey: He is the central figure
in this litigation.
Mr. Blankenship is not only the chairman, CEO, and president
of Massey, but he also holds more than 250,000 shares of the com-
pany's stock. See Massey Energy, News Release, Massey CEO Ex-
ercises Options Within Limited Trading Window and to Diversify
Assets (Feb. 8, 2008). Mr. Blankenship's business reputation and
personal finances therefore depend to a significant extent upon
Massey's financial well-being, which was materially weakened by
the $50 million verdict in this case. Moreover, Mr. Blankenship
personally directed the business decisions that gave rise to peti-
tioners' fraud claims (J.A. 63a-65a), and he provided extensive
testimony at trial about his business dealings with petitioners. Id.
5. See J.A. 674a n.29 (Benjamin, J., concurring) (citing U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Hel-
ton, 631 S.E.2d 559 (W. Va. 2005) (concurring in part and dissenting in part from an opi-
nion against Massey that was joined in full by three of the court's five justices); Helton v.
Reed, 638 S.E.2d 160 (W. Va. 2006) (concurring in an opinion against Massey that was
joined by three other justices); Massey Energy v. Wiheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., No.
080182 (W. Va. May 22, 2008) (voting with the court's four other justices to deny Massey's
petition for appeal)).
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at 89a. The jury evidently found Mr. Blankenship to lack credibil-
ity because it rejected his version of events when it returned the
fraud verdict against Massey. Mr. Blankenship therefore had a
powerful personal and professional interest in securing the rever-
sal of the jury's verdict, and Justice Benjamin had an equally po-
werful reason to repay his debt of gratitude to Mr. Blankenship by
casting the outcome -determinative vote in Massey's favor in this
important case.6
Justice Benjamin also asserted that his "campaign was corn-
pletely independent of any independent expenditure group," in-
cluding And For The Sake Of The Kids. J.A. 673a. But there is no
reason to believe that Justice Benjamin is any less likely to feel a
debt of gratitude to Mr. Blankenship because a majority of his fi-
nancial support was provided through And For The Sake Of The
Kids-an organization formed for the express purpose of defeating
Justice McGraw and electing Justice Benjamin-rather than di-
rectly to Justice Benjamin's campaign committee. Cf. FEC v.
Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2672 (2007) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.) ("in some circumstances, large independent expend-
itures pose the same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo
arrangements as do large contributions") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The end result was the same: Justice Benjamin benefited from
extensive advertising criticizing his sole opponent for office and
highlighting Justice Benjamin's qualifications. While Justice Ben-
jamin contends that his victory over Justice McGraw was princi-
pally attributable to his campaign message and Justice McGraw's
errors on the campaign trail (J.A. 673a-74a), it strains credulity to
suggest that the $3 million in financial support provided by Mr.
Blankenship-to say nothing of his other campaign efforts on Jus-
tice Benjamin's behalf-did not have a meaningful role in disse-
minating Justice Benjamin's message or highlighting Justice
McGraw's perceived flaws. Any reasonable observer would con-
clude that a justice who had benefited to such a significant extent
6. The extent to which a bias for or against Mr. Blankenship can translate into a bias
for or against Massey is underscored by Massey's repeated efforts in this case and other
litigation to obtain the recusal of Justice Starcher based on his public criticism of Mr.
Blankenship. See Motion for Disqualification of Justice Starcher at 6 ("Can there truly be
an honest debate whether a justice who has called a key witness in a case and the CEO of
one of the defendants 'stupid' and 'a clown' should sit on the case?"): see also Cent. W. Va.
Energy Co. v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., No. 08-218 (cert. denied Dec. 1, 2008) (peti-
tion by Massey and affiliated company arguing that Justice Starcher violated due process
by failing to recuse himself from a Massey case after publicly criticizing Mr. Blankenship).
Fall 2010 763
764 ~Duquesne Law ReviewVo.4
from a litigant's campaign expenditures would feel indebted to
that litigant for his support.
According to Justice Benjamin, the "long-lasting negative effect
on public confidence in our courts caused by an appearance- driven
due process standard for disqualification of a Judicial officer would
be incalculable." J.A. 663a. In fact, it is Justice Benjamin's par-
ticipation in his principal financial supporter's $50 million appeal
that could have an "incalculable" and "long-lasting negative effect"
on West Virginia's judicial system.
As this case vividly illustrates, the increasing prevalence of
massive campaign expenditures in state judicial elections has had
a corrosive effect on the public's confidence in the integrity of state
courts. See White, 536 U.S. at 790 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (cit-
ing survey data "indicating that 76 percent of registered voters
believe that campaign contributions influence judicial decisions").
Justice Benjamin's constricted understanding of due process-
which holds that litigants' campaign expenditures can never
create a probability of bias sufficient to mandate recusal-would
hasten the loss of public confidence in the judiciary and irretriev-
ably weaken the courts' "reputation for impartiality and nonparti-
sanship." Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 407.7
Although not every campaign contribution or expenditure by a
litigant or attorney creates a probability of bias that requires a
judge's recusal, there are exceptional cases where recusal is con-
stitutionally required-both to ensure the litigants' right to a fair
trial and to safeguard public confidence in the judicial system.
This is such a case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Justice Benjamin's decision not to re-
cuse himself should be reversed, the judgment of the Supreme
7. See, e.g., Editorial, Finally, Register Herald (Beckley, W. Va.), Feb. 18, 2008 ("Ben-
jamin clearly was aided by Blankenship's multi-million dollar campaign against incumbent
Warren McGraw and even[]J though the justice has stated unequivocally he isn't influenced
by Blankenship, it just doesn't look good."); Allan N. Karlin & John Cooper, Editorial, Per-
ception That Justice Can Be Bought Harms the Judiciary, Sunday Gazette Mail (Charles-
ton), Mar. 2, 2008, at 3C ("It is time to say publicly what attonrreys across the state are
saying privately: Justice Brent Benjamin needs to. .. step down from hearing cases involv-
ing Massey Energy and its subsidiaries. His continued involvement in Massey litigation
endangers the public perception of the integrity of the Supreme Court of Appeals.").
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Court of Appeals of West Virginia vacated, and the case remanded
for further proceedings without Justice Benjamin's participation.
Respectfully submitted.
DAVID B. FAWCETT THEODORE B. OLSON
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